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PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE SUPREME
COURT'S REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP
TEST: IGNORING THE ECONOMICS OF
DETERRENCE
KEVIN S. MARSHALL, J.D., M.P.A., PH.D.*
PATRICK FITZGERALD, J.D., PH.D.**
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we briefly review how punitive damages have
been used to punish and deter.' We then argue that to the extent
the recent Supreme Court rulings limit punitive damages to an
award "reasonably related" to actual damages, the Supreme
Court has eliminated the economic foundations of deterrence.
We make the case that the reasonable relationship test ignores
the fundamentals of economic theory that drive the perfect
competitive model. Fundamental economic theory recognizes the
individually specific nature of budget and/or isocost constraint
functions and utility and/or isoquant functions upon, which
economic agents make rational choices. To the extent that tort
reform ignores such economic theory and constructs, it obstructs
the rational choice model, which is the cornerstone of western
political and economic thought. With respect to the issue of
* Kevin S. Marshall is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of La Verne's
College of Law, Ontario, California. Dr. Marshall received his B.A. in economics from
Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois in 1982, a Juris Doctorate from Emory University
School of Law in 1985, a Masters in Public Affairs from the University of Texas at Dallas
in 1991, and a Ph.D. in political economy from the University of Texas at Dallas in 1993.
** Patrick W. Fitzgerald is a Professor of Finance and Economics at Oklahoma City
University. He is a graduate of the University of Texas at Arlington and he holds
graduate degrees from Harvard, Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary, SMU, Texas,
Oklahoma and Oklahoma University.
1 See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages In Product Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 1258, 1371 (1976) (discussing the roots of punitive damages going back to English
common law and beyond).
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punitive damages, we argue that the Supreme Court's
''reasonably related' test ignores the rational choice models
prevalent in economic policy. Finally, we discuss how this
ignorance of economic theory is arguably at the center of tort
reform in general; thus the arguments of this paper are
applicable to other tort reforms, including caps on non-economic
damages.
II. TORT REFORM AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The tort reform movement has influenced a number of
procedural and substantive legislative changes addressing such
issues as standing, standards of proof, and damage limits or caps,
all of which have placed constraints on the judicial
administration of tort claims. 2  Reformation implies "an
improvement by alteration, a correction of error, or a removal of
defects; a change for the better or correction of evils or abuses."3
Whether a change constitutes a reform necessitates the
identification of the abuse to be corrected and an inquiry as to
2 Various state statutes have modified the common law methods for awarding
punitive damages. See JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES, Practice
Aids § 7:92 (3d ed. 1997). Citations and comments are from Stein. In Germanio v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 732 F. Supp. 1297 (D.N.J. 1990), the Federal District Court
in New Jersey determined that the New Jersey Products Liability Act of 1987, N.J. STAT.
§ 2A:58C-5(a)-(c) (1987) (amended by Punitive Damages Act, Pub. L. 1995, ch. 142), could
survive constitutional challenges under the due process and excessive fines clauses. The
court rejected the defendant's argument that the statute created "standardless discretion"
for juries, or suffered from vagueness; it also held that the absence of a higher burden of
proof and double jeopardy protections were not constitutionally required. Id. at 1300-04.
Finally, it held that the requirement for consideration of defendant's wealth did not
violate the equal protection clause. Id. at 1305. In McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737
F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990), the federal district court declared Georgia's Tort Reform
Act provisions regulating punitive damages unconstitutional. The Georgia Tort Reform
Act 1987, GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) (1987), provided that in products liability cases
there would be no limit on the size of awards but that "only one award of punitive
damages may be recovered from a defendant for any act or omission... regardless of the
number of causes of action that may rise from such act or omission." Further, it provided
that 75 percent of any amounts awarded shall be paid into the state treasury. Id. § 51-12-
5.1(e)(2). First, the court held that the one-award provision unconstitutionally
discriminates between plaintiffs in products liability actions because it would deny any
awards to all but the first plaintiff whose claim arose out of a particular act or omission.
McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1569. Further, it unconstitutionally discriminates between
products liability punitive damage claimants and plaintiffs in non-products liability cases
who are not limited by the one-award provision. Id. Additionally, the act "on its face
arbitrarily discriminates between product liability punitive damages plaintiffs who secure
an award of punitive damages and may under the statute retain only 25% of such an
award and punitive damage tort plaintiffs in cases other than product liability actions
who may retain 100% of any award of punitive damages." Id.
3 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1039 (2d ed. 1982).
ECONOMICS OFDETERRENCE
the existence of a corresponding improvement expected to result
from the implemented change. Punitive damages have been
included as one of the targets for reform.4
The United States Supreme Court has recently identified the
award of excessive punitive damages as a matter to be addressed
and corrected. In BMW of North America5, Cooper Industries6,
and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 7 the Court
reversed and remanded three state court awards of punitive
damages, concluding that each was excessive. 8 Although tort
reformers welcomed the Supreme Court's proactive reversals of
each award, a thorough consideration of the Supreme Court's
evolving but myopic rationale reveals that we cannot expect a
corresponding improvement with respect to the regulation of
reprehensible conduct within the context of punitive damage
awards. Moreover, to characterize the Court's holdings as
reformatory is clearly suspect, especially given the asymmetrical
favor each holding bestows on the tortfeasor.
III. THE NATURE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Restatement Second, Torts 9 defines punitive damages as,
"[d]amages, other than compensatory or nominal damages,
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar
conduct in the future."O
Note that in this definition there are three points: (1) punitive
damages are not the same as compensatory or nominal damages;
(2) they address the objectives of punishment and deterrence;
4 See generally Kathryn L. Veniza, Constitutional Challenges to Caps on Punitive
Damages: Is Tort Reform the Dragon Slayer or Is It the Dragon, 42 ME. L. REV. 219 (1990).
5 517 U.S. 559, 586 (1996) (holding lower court's excessive monetary judgment as
transcending constitutional limits).
6 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (remanding case back to court of appeals while commenting
on the three Gore guidelines applicable to this case).
7 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (reversing Utah state court award as an irrational and
arbitrary deprivation of property).
8 See Engle v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 750 So. 2d 781, 782 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000)
(reversing class action decision where jury awarded $144.8 billion for smoke related
injuries). See generally Brian H. Barr, Engle v. R. J. Reynolds: The Improper Assessment
of Punitive Damages for an Entire Class of Injured Smokers, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 787,
787-828 (2001) (discussing Engle case and punitive damage issue in general).
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979).
10 Id. (defining punitive damage); accord KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984).
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and (3) they are to be based upon the performance of
"outrageous" conduct by the defendant." Professor Stein has
argued persuasively:
The Restatement definition of punitive damages is generally
in accord with the majority of judicial decisions and
statutory enactments governing their availability, although
a few states apply the doctrine of punitive damages to serve
compensatory or other purposes, which are described below.
Moreover, to state that the purpose of punitive damages is
not to compensate does not mean that. they are not
compensation-for obviously to the plaintiff they are
perceived as additional payments made to "compensate" for
the loss.12
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND PUNISHMENT
Professor Stein sums up the position of most jurisdictions in
that they "recognize the dual objectives of punishing the
defendant for its wrongful conduct and deterring the defendant
and others from repetition of the same or similar conduct in the
future."13 The starting point in considering the doctrine of
punitive damages in tort litigation is to recognize that they are
awarded in most jurisdictions14 by juries in order punish conduct
that is socially unacceptable in order to advance the objectives of
retribution and deterrence, which are usually associated with the
criminal law.15 It should be observed that while courts apply the
11 See STEIN, supra note 2, § 7:92 (discussing three points of punitive damages
definition).
12 Id. (arguing Restatement definition follows majority rule on compensation and
punitive damages).
13 Id. (explaining the purpose of punitive damages).
14 Id. (reporting "[a] few states apply the term 'punitive' or 'exemplary' damages as
part of a doctrine that is limited to essentially compensatory purposes.").
15 Id. (discussing objectives of criminal law); see, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco
Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 287 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (stating "[t]his Court's cases leave no doubt that punitive damages serve the same
purposes-punishment and deterrence-as the criminal law..." and that the role of
punitive damages "runs counter to the normal reparative function of tort and contract
remedies"); Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 422, n.7 (1987) (recognizing penal nature of
punitive damages); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 260-61 (1984) (agreeing
that punitive damages are "private fines levied by civil juries"); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing "quasi-criminal" nature of punitive
damages); Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981) (describing
punitive damage's objective as punishing and deterring tortfeasor's wrongful acts); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (explaining punitive damages as jury's way
to punish culpable conduct and deter from future occurrence).
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term "punishment," what they usually mean is retribution
against the wrongdoer, since the punishment itself (paying the
tort judgment) is also the means of effectuating the deterrence
and other objectives. 16 In other words, one of the aims of
punishment is to secure retribution for the conduct of the
defendant.17
According to Professor Dobbs:
Punitive damages might be assessed because the defendant
deserves to suffer for his misconduct and accompanying
mental state. That is to say, the defendant's wrong is such
that it is right in a moral sense that he be made to suffer,
irrespective of whether this will reform his character, deter
his misconduct, or set an example for others. This "just
desserts" approach is purely punitive. It is sometimes called
retributive, and it is the closest to a purely "criminal"
sanction. 18
In an Illinois decision, Kemner v. Monsanto Co.,19 we see the
notion that, when we punish the defendant, we also address the
need for retribution and deterrence:
16 Punitive damages have been with us since antiquity and were authorized in many
ancient cultures. See, e.g., Code of Hammurabi, ALBERT KOCOUREK & JOHN WIGNORE,
SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAw 391 § 8 (1915). See generally 9 Exodus 22:1
(King James); H.F. Jolowicz, The Assessment of Penalties in Primitive Law, in CAMBRIDGE
LEGAL ESSAYS 205-6 (1926).
17 The use of the term 'punishment' to denote imposing a detriment upon someone
implies retributive aim and, therefore, the notion of dessert. When detriment is
deserved, the imposition of the detriment is itself the 'good' being sought, and it is not
necessary that any other good consequences result. Dessert is necessary and
sufficient and provides a complete answer to the question 'Why should X be
punished?'
See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L REV. 1, 4 (1982).
18 Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-Measured
Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831, 844 (1989); STEIN, supra note 2, § 4:3 (discussing the role
of punishment in punitive damages). See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 444 (1993) (plurality) (emphasizing the retributive purposes of punitive damages
where the defendant's conduct exhibited a pattern of a fraud, trickery and deceit); see also
Gillespie v. Seymour, 853 P.2d 692, 695 (Kan. 1993) (noting that "[p]unitive damages are
imposed by way of punishing a party for malicious or vindictive acts or for a willful and
wanton invasion of another party's rights, the purposes being to restrain him and to deter
others from the commission of a like wrong"); Adams v. Coates, 626 A.2d 36, 42 (Md.
1993) (noting that punitive damages are "awarded in an attempt to punish a defendant
whose conduct is characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, or fraud, and to warn
others contemplating similar conduct of the serious risk of monetary liability" (quoting
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 648 (Md. 1992))).
19 576 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
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Today, the nature of punitive damages in Illinois is clearly
singular-it is punishment for the defendant. That
punishment is designed in turn to promote three purposes:
(1) to act as retribution against the defendant; (2) to deter
the defendant from committing similar wrongs in the future;
and (3) to deter others from similar conduct. 20
Professor Stein argues:
Other courts have described this use of tort law to fulfill a
criminal law function. 21 Because most courts express the
view, usually with little comment or discussion, that punitive
damages are intended to serve the dual purposes of
retribution and deterrence, courts have almost universally
acknowledged that punishment is at least one of the
principle rationales justifying the assessment of punitive
damages.22 However, only a few decisions have expressed the
view that the primary or sole purpose of punitive damages is
to punish the tortuous wrongdoer. 23
20 Id. (quoting Hazelwood v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 450 N.E.2d 1199, 1207 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983)).
21 STEIN, supra note 2, § 4:3; see, e.g., Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 NW.2d 437, 448
(Wis. 1980); KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 2, at 9.
22 STEIN, supra note 2, § 4:3; see, e.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,
266-67 (1981) (discussing the dual purposes of punitive damages); Barber v. National
Bank of Alaska, 815 P.2d 857, 864 (Alaska 1991) (acknowledging two-fold purpose of
punitive damages); Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 172 Cal. Rptr. 59, 62-63 (Ct.
App.1981) (noting that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter culpable
conduct); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assoc., Inc., 473
N.W.2d 612, 617 (Iowa 1991) (noting that punitive damages punish and deter wrongful
conduct); Traylor v. Wachter, 607 P.2d 1094, 1098 (Kan. 1980) (stating that punitive
damages punish and restrain the offending party while deterring others); Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 601 A.2d at 649-55 (discussing extensively the purposes of punitive damages in
Maryland); Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So. 2d 1172, 1189-90 (Miss.
1990) (noting that punitive damages are primarily used to deter and punish but also serve
other functions such as awarding a private plaintiff for bringing the wrongdoer to
account); Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105, 1115 (Okla, 1991) (stating that
"punitive damages are awarded to punish the wrongdoer for the wrong committed upon
society..."); Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 797 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Or. 1990)
(discussing the trial judge's instructions to the jury that punitive damages are to be
determined by looking at the defendant's conduct and to punish him); Hodges v. S. C. Toof
& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tenn. 1992) (stating the contemporary purpose of punitive
damages are to punish the wrongdoer and to deter him, as well as others); Garnes v.
Fleming Landfill, 413 S.E.2d 897, 900-04 (W. Va. 1991) (discussing thoroughly that the
purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter but also noting that it can serve other
functions such as encouraging good faith efforts at settlement).
23 STEIN, supra note 2, § 4:3; see, e.g., Hutchens v. Weinberger, 452 So. 2d 1024, 1025
(Fla. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that punitive damages are allowable but solely as punishment
to be inflicted on the defendant (quoting Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer,171 So.
214, 222-23 (Fla. 1936))); Christlieb v. Luten, 633 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(calling punitive damages "punishment"); Owen v. Owen, 642 S.W.2d 410, 415 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982) (positing punitive damages as having a "purpose of punishing"); Johnson v.
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V. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND DETERRENCE
Professor Stein succinctly sums up the goals of deterrence
relating to punitive damages:
Although it is manifestly clear that the punitive damages
doctrine, when serving a retributive purpose, is directed to
the defendant, it is not equally clear when serving the
function of deterrence, to whom they are directed. The issue
is one of special deterrence versus general deterrence, with
the former being targeted at the defendant alone and the
latter at society more generally, or at those similarly
situated as the defendant who might engage in similar
conduct if not deterred by the penalty imposed on the
defendant.24
Stein refers us to Professor Dobbs, who defines specific or
special deterrence as "an assessment necessary to deter the
defendant from repeated misconduct," and general deterrence as
"not to deter the defendant himself, but to set an example to
deter others who are not parties and who may have done nothing
wrongful."25 "The latter represents the exemplary damages
theory of punitive damages. 26 A number of recent decisions have
explicitly recognized the general deterrence objective in allowing
sizeable awards of punitive damages."27
Murray, 656 P.2d 170, 175 (1982) (citing punitive damage awards as a "way of punishing
the defendant"); Branch v. Western Petroleum, 657 P.2d 267, 278 (Utah 1982)
(articulating purpose to "punish the wrongdoer" (quoting Terry v. Zion's Coop. Mercantile
Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 328 (Utah 1979))).
24 STEIN, supra note 2, § 4:4.
25 Dobbs, supra note 18, at 844-46.
26 STEIN, supra note 2, § 4:4; see Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical
Continuity of Punitive Damage Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U.L. REV.
1269, 1320-21 (1993) (discussing the different purposes that punitive damages serve); see
also Robert A. Klinck, Reforming Punitive Damages-The Punitive Damages Debate, 38
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 470-71 (2001) (discussing the history and purposes of punitive
damages).
27 STEIN, supra note 2, § 4:4. Drabik v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 1271,
1273, (W.D. Mo. 1992), vacated by 997 F.2d 496 (1993). The court observed that punitive
damages should be sufficient for deterrence. Cont'l Trend Res. v. Oxy USA, Inc., 810 F.
Supp. 1520, 1526-27 (W.D. Okla. 1992), affl'd, 44 F.3d 1465 (10th Cir. Okla. 1995),
vacated by, 517 U.S. 1216 (1996). The court upheld a $30 million punitive award in a case
involving tortious interference with economic relations stressing both the special and
general deterrence objective. Id. The court went on to state:
Consequently, high punitive damages may be awarded when warranted by the facts
in light of the state's purposeful interest in individualized assessment of appropriate
deterrence and punishment .... A judgment of $30 million against this defendant
under the justifying circumstances of this case sends a sharp, but certainly not
2005]
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VI. PUNISHMENT, DETERRENCE, AND THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court accepts the view that, unlike
compensatory damages, which are intended to redress a
plaintiffs concrete loss, punitive damages are aimed at the
different purpose of deterrence and retribution. In a 1991 case
entitled Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,28 the Court
said "punitive damages are imposed for purposes of retribution
and deterrence."29 In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tools
Group, Inc.,30 the Court said, "punitive damages may properly be
imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition."31
According to the Court, punitive damages "serve the same
purpose as criminal penalties."32 Furthermore, the Due Process
Clause prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary
punishments on a tortfeasor.33 Given that civil defendants are
not accorded the same protections of criminal defendants,
punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation
of property, which is heightened when the decision maker is
presented evidence having little bearing on the amount that
devastating, lesson of deterrence to this defendant and any other potential defendant
who is like minded and similarly situated.
28 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
29 Id. at 19.
30 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
31 BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996), in which the Supreme Court
held that the due process clause prohibits the imposition of "grossly excessive" awards in
relation to the legitimate interest of the State.
32 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (stating that
although punitive damages awards serve the same purposes as criminal penalties,
defendants in civil actions do not have the traditional protections that a defendant has in
criminal proceedings).
33 See id. at 416-17, in which the Court explained that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment creates limitations on the discretion of the states in imposing
punitive damages. See also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S.
424, 433-34 (2001), in which the Court states that the Due Process Clause creates these
limitations because it makes the Eighth Amendment's "prohibition against excessive
fines" applicable to the States. But see TXO Prod. v. Alliance Res., 509 U.S. 443, 446
(1993) (plurality), where the Supreme Court upheld a punitive damages award of $10
million where the compensatory damages award was only $19,000, which was 526 times
the compensatory damages awarded and was probably not an endorsement of such a high
ratio given the fact that the court also considered the potential compensatory damages.
Cf. Colbern C. Stuart III, Note, Mean, Stupid Defendants Jarring Our Constitutional
Sensibilities: Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages After TXO Production v. Alliance
Resources, 30 CAL. W. L. REV. 313, 333-37 (1994), where the author discusses the
Supreme Court's "reasonableness" test, which was created in order to limit punitive
damages based on due process concerns, and argues that courts will have difficulty in
applying these Constitutional limits on punitive damages because of the ambiguity of
TXO.
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should be awarded. 34 In a 1996 case, BMW of North America v.
Gore,35 the Court held that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was violated, based
on an award of $145 million in punitive damages and $1 million
in compensatory damages. To reach this conclusion, the Court
used, and instructed that when reviewing an award of punitive
damages, courts are to consider:36
1. The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
misconduct,
2. The disparity between the actual or potential harm
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award,
and
3. The difference between the punitive damages awarded by
the jury and civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases.37
As late as April 7, 2003, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell38 applied these three factors from the
Gore case. This decision concerned a Utah case dealing with the
claims of an auto insurance carrier and its insured. The
Campbell court did not set a specific multiplier, but said "few
awards exceeding a single digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages will satisfy due process." 39 The Court
went on to say that "an award of more than four times the
34 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418 (describing shortcomings of civil punitive damages,
which give juries wide discretion in imposing awards).
35 BMW, 517 U.S. at 585-86 (holding that the punitive damages award granted by
the jury was "grossly excessive" and "transcend[ed] the constitutional limit").
36 See Bruce J. McKee, The Implication of BMW v. Gore for Future Punitive
Litigation: Observation From a Participant, 48 ALA. L. REV. 175, 185, 201-15 (1996)
(discussing the reaction of the courts of Alabama and other jurisdictions to the test used
in BMW v. Gore).
37 BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75 (describing the three factors used by the Court, and
holding that the defendant did not receive adequate notice of the size of the potential
punishment, and that the punishment was grossly excessive).
38 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418-29 (applying the Gore factors, stating that the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendants' conduct is the most important of the factors).
39 Id. at 425 (rejecting strict mathematical methods of establishing a constitutional
limit on the proportion of punitive damages to compensatory damages, but affirming the
need for a relatively low ratio).
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amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of
constitutional propriety."40
Although we know that punitive damages are supposed to
serve as a deterrent and to punish, we also know that most cases
settle and that punitive damages are rarely awarded in those
cases going to trial.41 Although there is reason to believe that
settlements are impacted by the threat of possible punitive
damages, one must wonder if tort reform and the recent Supreme
Court holdings are acting to negate the very purpose of such
damages.42 While these factors identified by the Court may be
relevant to a comprehensive analysis of the merits of a punitive
damage award, they completely ignore the historical and
fundamental purposes of punitive damages, economics of
punishment and deterrence. 43
40 Id. at 425 (stating that a punitive damages award that was four times
compensatory damages had a significant historic precedent).
41 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages,
REG. Sept-Oct. 1986 at 33 (finding that only 2% of product liability cases result in
punitive damages); see also Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality In
Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 31 (1990) (finding that only 4.9% of all verdicts
included punitive damages from their research sample); Michael Rustad, In Defense of
Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes With Empirical Data, 78
IOWA L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1992) (reporting that only 355 cases with punitive damages were
found in a quarter of a century of cases); RICHARD L. BLATT, ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A
STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW & PRACTICE, §1.4 (2004 ed.) (reporting that as late as
1992 there were no punitive damage awards for more than $100 million, but in 2001,
there were 16 awards that were that large); Thomas Koenig, Measuring the Shadow of
Punitive Damages: Their Effect on Bargaining, Litigation, and Corporate Behavior: The
Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 169, 201 (discussing
the findings of the insurance industry, which reached the conclusion that claims for
punitive damages had a low impact on settlements in the 27 states surveyed).
42 See Cynthia T. Andreason, State Farm v. Campbell: What Happens Next?, 71 U.S.
L. WK. 2691, 2692 (May 5, 2003) (explaining that the "Campbell Court drastically
curtailed consideration of potential criminal penalties on the ground that cases in which
punitive damages can be awarded lack the protections that attach to criminal
prosecutions").
43 See Patrick S. Ryan, The U.S. Supreme Court Introduces the Single-Digit
Multipliers To Punitive Damages (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs.
Campbell), EUR. L. REP., May 2003, at 190, 193, referring to the dissenting opinions as
follows:
Justices Scalia and Thomas regularly dissent whenever the Supreme Court overturns
punitive damages. According to Scalia and Thomas, the Constitution should not be
used to reduce the size of punitive damage awards. Scalia and Thomas would have
upheld the $145,000 judgment.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent was more detailed and speaks to the tort reform movement
in the U.S. According to Ginsburg, the legislatures, not the courts, should pass laws
to limit punitive damages. Ginsburg also extensively reviewed the data and found the
action by State Farm was extremely reprehensible. Consequently, Ginsburg, like
Scalia and Thomas, would have let the $145,000 award stand.
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VII. THE DEGREE OF REPREHENSIBILITY
The Court views that the most important indicia of the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.44 However, this
specific inquiry drives the determination of whether punitive
damages should be awarded in the first place. 45 This line of
inquiry provides little insight into whether the amount of the
award is unconstitutionally excessive. It merits noting that
many state court jurisdictions legislatively mandate that a
plaintiff must prove a degree of reprehensible conduct, as defined
by statute, before being entitled to seek an award of punitive
damages. For example, in Texas, it is necessary for a plaintiff to
plead and prove by clear and convincing evidence by a
unanimous verdict that the harm in question resulted from
fraud, malice, or a willful act or omission, or gross neglect. 46
Texas further statutorily defines malice to mean: "a specific
intent by the defendant to cause substantial injury to the
claimant."47 Texas statutorily defines gross negligence to mean
an act or omission:
(A) which, when viewed objectively from the standpoint of
the actor at the time of its occurrence, involves an extreme
44 BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 575 (1996). The court noted as an example that
non-violent crimes are less reprehensible than violent crimes. State Farm, 538 U.S. at
418. The court emphasized in Cooper regarding the defendant's reprehensibility in
determining punitive damages. Patrick S. Ryan, Revisiting the United States Application
of Punitive Damages: Separating Myth from Reality, 10 ILSA J INT'L & CoMP L 69, 92-93
(2003).
The United States Supreme Court's recent Campbell decision further secures the
rationale and policy, and provides further clarification (particularly the "single digit
multiplier" in cases of low reprehensibility). While the U.S. Supreme Court has still
declined to set an absolute constitutional limit on punitive damage awards, its
holding in State Farm that "single-digit multipliers" are more likely to agree with due
process is so far the clearest guidance available concerning the permissible size of
punitive damages.
Id. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 434-35 (2001). Citing United
States v. Baj, 524 U.S. 321, 337 (1998), the court proposed that part of the relevant
inquiry as to whether a punishment is excessive is the "degree of reprehensibility or
culpability of the defendant's conduct."
45 See Ellis, Jr., supra note 17, at 3-9 (arguing that "desert requires proportionality of
punishment in a relative sense as well: greater wrongs should be punished more severely
than lesser transgressions"); see also Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?
Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 163, 204-05 (2003) (concluding that the Court in Cooper erred in relying on a
historical rationale for punitive damages as serving a compensatory purpose).
46 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §41.003 (2004)
47 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 204.
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degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of
the potential harm to others; and
(B) of which the actor has actual, subjective awareness of the
risk involved, but nevertheless proceeds with conscious
indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others. 48
Upon the Texas trier-of-fact's unanimous determination that
the plaintiff has satisfied his or her burden as to the existence of
this reprehensible conduct, the plaintiff may then seek punitive
damages. Upon this finding, one may then argue that the
defendant must not only compensate the plaintiff for his
damages, but must also be punished in order to deter the
defendant from such conduct in the future, as well as to deter
others similarly situated from engaging in such conduct.
Although this factor may be one of the more important factors
to consider as to whether an award of punitive damages is
appropriate (and if it is not appropriate, then any amount
awarded would be considered excessive), it does not provide any
insight as to whether an award is excessive in terms of
constituting a punishment and/or deterrence.
VIII. THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL HARM
SUFFERED BY THE PLAINTIFF AND THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD
The second indicium of an "unreasonable or excessive punitive
damages award," which is applied by the Court, is the "ratio to
the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff."49 The Court refers to
this prong of the inquiry as the "reasonable relationship" test; the
Court has held that the award of exemplary damages must bear
a reasonable relationship to the compensatory damages. 50
Although the Court has been reluctant to identify concrete
constitutional limits on the ratio of the harm, or potential harm,
48 Id.
49 BMW, 517 U.S. at 580 (noting that this concept has a long pedigree in English
common law); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459 (1993)
(acknowledging plaintiffs argument that the award of 526 times the actual damages is
excessive); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991) (noting that the
"reasonably satisfied from the evidence" standard for punitive damages is sufficient to
survive a Due Process challenge).
50 BMW, 517 U.S. at 580 (noting that the "decisions in both Haslip and TXO endorsed
the proposition that a comparison between the compensatory award and the punitive
award is significant").
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to the plaintiff and the punitive damage award, the Court stated
that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages will satisfy due process." 51
The Court's reasonable relationship test is not grounded on
any objective standard; instead, it is grounded on the arbitrary
dictum of the Court. More importantly, this prong is myopic in
that it considers only the harm suffered by the plaintiff and fails
to consider any individual or specific characteristics relevant to
the defendant. This one-dimensional inquiry completely ignores
data relevant to whether the magnitude of the award constitutes
a punitive award from the defendant's perspective so that it will
deter future similar wrongful conduct. We observe that an award
that ultimately satisfies the Court's "reasonable relationship"
test may nonetheless fail to punish and/or deter the defendant for
his or her reprehensible conduct. While the award may be
reasonably related to the harm (whatever that might mean), it
may fail completely at being perceived by the defendant to be a
punishment and thus lose its deterring effect.
Successful deterrence results from the defendant (or others
similarly situated) making a rational choice to abstain from
engaging in future reprehensible conduct. The Court's inquiry is
completely void of any concern regarding the actual deterring
effect of the punitive award. The Court's recent rulings ignore
whether the award may have a deterring effect. Therefore, its
approach may render punitive damage awards in many cases
nothing more than an award of enhancement damages. To the
extent the award may nonetheless result in a deterring effect on
future reprehensible conduct, such an effect will be the result of
chance only (the chance that, while it may satisfy the Court's
reasonable relationship test, it is coincidentally perceived by the
defendant as punitive). The Court's algorithm for reviewing
punitive damages essentially ignores the punitive nature of such
damages.
51 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (noting that
the Court in Gore found the granting of double or treble damages in punitive awards
instructive).
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IX. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AWARDED BY THE JURY AND CIVIL PENALTIES AUTHORIZED OR
IMPOSED IN COMPARABLE CASES
The third and final indicia of excessiveness by the Court to
compare the punitive damages award with the civil or criminal
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.5 2 We
reiterate that this prong of the inquiry completely ignores
whether the award itself is actually punitive in nature. We
therefore limit our discussion of this prong by observing that it
provides the court with substantial discretion with respect to its
determination of what is a comparable civil or criminal penalty.
The Court's application of this tenet appears to be limited to
identifying comparable, legislatively imposed, penalties and not
other court imposed sanctions. This arguably dismisses the
importance of the judicial branch of government. Moreover,
given our common law tradition, we note that we would expect
the existence of such legislative penalties to be limited; it is not
reasonable to expect that one will likely find many relevant
legislative sanctions against which to compare the award in
question. Moreover, if such a comparison is merited, should the
court not also take into consideration the many criminal
penalties resulting in the forfeiture of liberty?
Many states impose the penalty of death for intentional,
reprehensible conduct resulting in the death of another.5 3
Although excessive punitive damages may arguably be the
equivalent of a death penalty with respect to a certain business,
given the magnitude of the award, this requirement may
nonetheless be relevant given the similar reprehensible conduct
of a criminal defendant. In short, we conclude that this third
prong of the analysis is at best ambiguous, distracting, and
dubious.
52 BMW, 517 U.S. at 583 (noting that past jurisprudence has advised showing
substantial deference to the legislature in determining punishment); State Farm, 538 U.S.
at 425 (clarifying that "punitive damages are not a substitute for the criminal process,
and the remote possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a punitive
damages award").
53 See Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court's Backwards Proportionality
Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and
Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1253 (2000) (noting that "in its
death-penalty jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has recognized that deprivations of life
are entitled to more protection than deprivations of liberty").
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X. THE ECONOMICS OF PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE
Punishment and deterrence are individual-specific and related
constructs. Although it is often said that the punishment
prescribed by the trier-of-fact for one's wrongful act is the price
one must pay to society for his or her wrongful indulgence, it is
also the threat of being assessed this price that serves to deter
the wrongful conduct. While it is also often stated that "the
punishment must fit the crime," 54 it must also fit the character of
wrongful actor, e.g., the availability of probation for first time
offenders, maximum sentences to repeat offenders, etc. The
prescribed punishment internalizes the costs of wrongful,
reprehensible conduct. 55 The magnitude of the punishment (the
price) necessarily places the wrongdoer in a scenario of rational
choice. In the absence of punishment or threat of punishment,
the cost of wrongful, reprehensible conduct is external to the
rational acting individual. 56 Accordingly, legally prescribed
punishments attempt to correct market failure as it pertains to
the internalization of the costs associated with antisocial
conduct.
While the Supreme Court reiterates its view of punitive
damages as being aimed at the purposes of deterrence and
retribution, the Court ignores the relevant economic
54 Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor's Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 127 (2003) (stating "integral to retributivism is the notion that
punishment must be in proportion to, and to the extent of, an offender's just deserts").
55 See Steven L. Chanenson and John Y. Gotanda, The Foggy Road for Evaluating
Punitive Damages: Lifting the Haze from the BMW/State Farm Guideposts, 37 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 441, 444 (2004) (arguing that the "guideposts" are difficult to use and have
resulted in inconsistent decisions and that a third guidepost should compare the punitive
damages award to the criminal or civil sanctions that could be imposed for conduct which
is comparable).
56 See Ryan, supra note 44, at 92 on the rationality of the U.S. system regarding
punitive damages:
[T]he U.S. System may operate in a manner that is confusing-some may say
inefficient-it is not irrational. This is not to say that the U.S. tort system does not
need reform, because it does. With respect to who receives the payouts of punitive
damage awards, i.e. generally the victim, the author supports a commonly held
reform view that punitive damages should be paid (at least partially) to government.
Although this view still needs to be reconciled against the incentive argument, i.e.
that plaintiffs should have an incentive to bring to court cases in which defendant
conduct is egregious and against public policy. A trend in tort reform is already in
place that requires portions of punitive damages to be given up by the plaintiffs; so
far eight states have enacted laws in this regard. On the whole, however, solid
empirical data exist to show that the full review procedure will often assure rational
results for tort cases in the end. BMW v. Gore is an example of this rationality as a
case that emerged from the full functioning of the U.S. system.
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underpinnings related to the same. In determining whether
punitive damages are excessive, it is necessary that the
magnitude of the punitive damage award be assessed in the
context of the wrongdoer's budget and/or isocost constraint
functions. Clearly, the magnitude of the punitive damage must
have some relationship to the tortfeasor's budget and/or isocost
constraints. Ignoring any such relationship negates any
underlying rationale for punishment and deterrence and renders
the award of punitive damages much more susceptible to
arbitrary implementation.
XI. THE RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL, ISOQUANT AND ISOCOST
FUNCTIONS
Drawing from the fundamentals of microeconomics and price
theory,5 7 it can be demonstrated that punitive damages must
have some relationship to the financial status (the willingness or
ability to pay) of the tortfeasor. If we assume a two input model
of production consisting of neither capital nor labor, but rather,
reprehensible production techniques and reasonable production
techniques, we can derive an isoquant denoted below by Ii.
Isoquant Ii shows all combinations of inputs that yield the same
level of output.
The amount of the two inputs (reprehensible and reasonable
conduct) that the firm uses will depend on the prices of these
inputs. The cost of hiring either of these factor inputs is
57 See ROBERT S. PINDYCK AND DANIEL L. RUBENFELD, MICROECONOMICS 216-22
(Prentice-Hall, 5th ed. 2001) (discussing the cost-minimizing input choice model of which
we have adapted for illustrative purposes in this article). See generally PAUL A.
SAMULESON AND WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 132-34, 142-45 (McGraw-Hill
Irwin, 17th ed. 2001); STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY 159-62 (Thomson South-
Western, 6th ed. 2005); STEPHEN A. MATHIS AND JANET KOSCIANSKI, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY, AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 238-49 (Prentice-Hall 2002); EDWIN MANSFIELD AND
GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICS 234-43 (W.W. Norton & Co. lth ed. 2004); WALTER
NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 212-17
(Thomson South-Western, 9th ed., 2005); MICHAEL E. WETZSTEIN, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY, CONCEPTS & CONNECTIONS 222-27 (Thomson South-Western, 2005); MARK
HIRSCHEY, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 241-55 (Thomson South-Western, 2003); PAUL G.
KEAT AND PHILIP K. Y. YOUNG, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: ECONOMIC TOOLS FOR TODAY'S
DECISION MAKERS 313-25 (Prentice-Hall, 4th ed. 2003); JAMES R. McGuIGAN,
MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: APPLICATIONS, STRATEGY, AND TACTICS 317-26 (Thomson
South-Western, 10th ed. 2005); S. CHARLES MAURICE AND CHRISTOPHER R. THOMAS,
MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS, 356-75 (Irwin McGraw-Hill, 6th ed. 1999); LILA J. TRUETT AND
DALE B. TRUETT, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 179-92 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 8th ed.
2004); DOMINICK SALVATORE, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 244-51
(Thomson South-Western, 5th ed. 2004).
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represented by a firm's isocost function. An isocost line shows all
possible combinations of the two inputs that can be purchased for
a given total cost.
The total cost C of producing any particular output is given by
the sum of the firm's input costs associated with reprehensible
production activity and reasonable production activity
summarized by the following linear equation:
C = PxQx + PyQy, where
C = total costs of production,
Px = the price of reasonable input activities,
Q= the quantity of reasonable input activities utilized in
production,
Py = the price of reprehensible input activities, and
Qy = the quantity of reprehensible input activities utilized in
production.
If we rewrite the total cost equation as an equation for a straight
line, we derive:
Qy = C/Py - (Px/Py)Qx
Reprehensible
Conduct Rational Choice Model
S1 lsocost Function without
. Punitive Damages
Reasonable
Conduct
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It follows that the isocost line has a slope of AQy/AQ. (the
change in quantity of reprehensible input activities utilized in
the firm's production activities divided by the change in quantity
of reasonable input activities utilized in the firm's production
activities) which is equal to -(P./Py), the ratio of the price of
reasonable input activities to the price of reprehensible input
activities. It tells us that if the firm gave up a unit of reasonable
input activities (and recovered Px dollars in cost) to buy P./Py
units of reprehensible input activities at a cost of Py dollars per
unit, the total cost of production would remain the same. For
example, if the cost or price of reasonable input activities (Px)
was $10 and the cost or price of reprehensible input activities (Py)
was $5, the firm could replace one unit of reasonable input
activities with two units of reprehensible input activities with no
change in total cost.
A rationally acting firm will choose a combination of inputs
where the firm's isoquant is tangent with the firm's isocost curve.
The point of tangency of Isoquant I1 and the isocost line reveals
the cost-minimizing choice of inputs Qx and Qy, which can be read
directly from the above diagram. At this point, the slopes of the
isoquant and the isocost lines are just equal.
Suppose that the price of reprehensible input activities were to
increase as a result of the imposition of punitive damages. In
that case, the slope of the isocost line -(Px/Py) would increase in
magnitude and the isocost line would become flatter.
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The above diagram illustrates that the firm minimizes its costs
of producing output Ii by using Q. units of reasonable input
activities and Qy of reprehensible input activities. When the
price of reprehensible input activities increase, the firm's isocost
function (or line) becomes flatter, pivoting on the X axis with the
Y intercept shifting downward from C/Py to C/Py'. Facing the
higher price for reprehensible input activities, the firm
minimizes its cost of production at 12 utilizing Q.' units of
reasonable input activities and Qy' units of reprehensible input
activities. Notably, the rational firm has responded to the higher
price of reprehensible input activities by substituting reasonable
input activities for reprehensible input activities in the
production process.
Equally important is that the higher price for reprehensible
input activities resulting from the imposition of punitive
damages also constrains the firm's input cost budget. Therefore,
it can no longer afford to produce at the same level of production
represented by isoquant Ii, but rather can only attain 12 level of
production at its point of tangency with the firm's isocost
function with punitive damages.
In summary, the rational actor model that drives fundamental
microeconomic theory upon, which the success of our large
commercial republic thrives, demonstrates that the imposition of
punitive damages requires a firm to internalize the cost of
production associated with reprehensible conduct. Punitive
Reprehensible
Conduct Rational Choice Model
Reasonable
Conduct
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damages increases the price of reprehensible input activities that
results in a rational firm decreasing its use of reprehensible
input activities Qy and increasing its use of reasonable input
activities Q.. The magnitude of the effect on the firm's
production activities and its choice of inputs necessarily depend
on the firm's production budget and financial status of the firm,
the wealthier the firm or greater its ability to pay, the smaller
the effect. Accordingly, one of the dominant factors any court
should consider when reviewing the award of punitive damages
is the financial position of the firm, i.e. its isocost function (or
production cost budget). The extent to which a firm is "willing to
pay" the punitive price for reprehensible production activities is a
function of the firm's isoquant and isocost functions. To ignore
these individual-specific functional relationships renders the
stated purposes of punitive damages, i.e. punishment and
deterrence, meaningless.
XII. CONCLUSION
The existing synergy driving tort reform across the United
States is grounded upon the economic utility of special interest
groups. It ultimately threatens the fundamental economic
principles upon which our great commercial republic thrives.
Ironically, the proponents of tort reform welcome legislation
and/or judicial mandates that essentially challenge, if not
eliminate, critical components of the pricing mechanism of a
perfectly competitive marketplace of which such proponents
would unequivocally and zealously object if implemented in their
relevant commercial markets. Accordingly, it is no surprise that
the recent Supreme Court opinions rendered in BMW, Cooper
and State Farm are perceived as welcomed victories by most tort
reformers. However, such perceptions are economically ill-
conceived.
Acknowledgement of individual producer and consumer
isoquant and isoutility functions is fundamental in the study of
microeconomics. More importantly, its recognition is vital to the
efficient production, allocation and consumption of scarce
resources. Producer and consumer isoquant and isoutility
functions reflect the unique values market participants place on
goods and services in all markets. Simply put, utility is the
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satisfaction gained by producers and consumers in their
respective economic transactions. The drive to maximize such
utility fuels economic activity, minimizes economic waste, and
maximizes market efficiencies, resulting in the creation of
economic wealth.
Economic theory, as well as historical experience,
demonstrates that governments cannot accurately regulate,
mandate, or dictate individual economic utility. Economics has
long observed that economic utility is profoundly unique to each
producer and/or consumer, such that it is only capable of being
measured from an individual perspective. Economic choice
emanates from the efforts of atomistic individuals pursing the
maximization of their economic utility as they identify, reveal,
and act upon their respective tastes and preferences in the
market place. Market participants value goods and services
differently. For example, one market participant values the
consumption of certain products more than other market
participants, and it is the manifestation of these unique values
from which the supply and demand forces of the product market
in question efficiently determine market prices.
The Supreme Court's recent proactive review of state court
punitive damage awards is driven by a tripartite analysis that
ignores the fundamental economic underpinnings of punishment
and deterrence. While identifying the issue of excessiveness
relevant to the awarding of punitive damages, the Court fails to
provide any improvement with respect to the same, especially
given its myopic reasoning and its unawareness of applicable
economic theory. Such unawareness will likely influence the
tortfeasor's rational-cost minimizing choice with respect to the
utilization of reasonable and/or reprehensible input activities. If
the price of reprehensible input activities decreases relative to
the price of reasonable input activities, then one can anticipate
an increase in such reprehensible activities.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's dismissive attitude towards the
economics of deterrence and punitive damages is discouraging. 58
58 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 438 (2001).
While Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for the court, he dismissively noted Polinsky
& Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harvard L. Rev. 869 (1998),
Judge Calabresi's theoretical opinion rendered in Ciraolo v. New York, 216 F.3d. 236, 244-
245 (C.A.2 2000), and Galanter & Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 Am U.L. Rev. 1393 (1993), all of which address related efficiency issues
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By avoiding the economics underlying deterrence, the Supreme
Court is characteristically reducing an entitlement and ultimate
award of punitive damages to that of enhancement damages.
Such damages are no longer grounded on and driven by
conventional economic constructs, but rather are now grounded
on the arbitrary precedent of the appellate judiciary.
By extension, the above analysis is applicable as well to other
tort-reform measures, such as statutory mandates capping
damages. To the extent such statutory caps operate to distort
the price tortfeasors must pay to engage in negligent conduct,
such caps will result in inefficient judicial outcomes. Statutory
damage caps essentially fix the maximum price a tortfeasor must
pay to engage in negligent activity. Accordingly, compensatory
damages subject to statutory mandated caps (like the judicially
mandated caps discussed above) are grounded on arbitrary policy
choices, rather than the conventional economic constructs that
have long been endorsed by and have fueled our commercial
republic.
with respect to the award of punitive damages. Id. Justice Steven's maintained that
"[h]owever attractive such an approach to punitive damages might be as an abstract
policy, it is clear that juries do not normally engage in such a finely tuned exercise of
deterrence calibration when awarding punitive damages." Id. at 439.
